SOVIET HISTORY LESSONS

One of the most famous Russian dissidents, Vladimir Bukovsky (who had spent 12 years of Soviet camps, prisons and psychiatric hospitals), issues a grave warning at the time of the Versailles summit to Western democracies in his latest work "Pacifists against Peace" (published by Robert Laffont): "Stop supporting countries in the East with your credits. You are in the process of making the rope that will hang you." Bukovsky's thesis is simple: Soviet Russia, because of the pressure of discontent within the country, is forced to engage in activism outside of its borders. It resembles an over-inflated balloon which  fills all the voids. It is therefore a philosophy of resistance that Bukovsky advises in this interview given to our journalist Eugene Silianoff.

Eugene Silianoff: The Soviet Union's over-arming policy has often been explained by fear of encirclement and external threat. If this theory could sound reasonable after the Revolution, what about sixty-five years later?

Vladimir Bukovsky: You see, this theory was created by Soviet propagandists and was systematically developed to serve as a smokescreen in order to continue the armament effort, to justify the preponderant role of the army, and to keep the Soviet people in a state of fear. It is doubly wrong. First, it knowingly confuses the Russian people and the regime. Which of the two would be afraid? There can be no question regarding the people because we forget, in the West, that in the Soviet political system the people are never consulted with and have never had the slightest means of manifesting this feeling of fear which the party propaganda attributes to them.

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NO SOVIET ACTION IS DEFENSIVE

But neither can the leaders be afraid because they know better than anyone that the West is not only not preparing to attack the USSR, but is ready to give in and make any concessions in order to avoid any possibility of conflict. The demonstration of this desire for capitulation has not ceased to be renewed since the Second World War. The USSR occupied all of the Central and Eastern Europe without the slightest reaction from the West. As for encirclement, it does exist, but in the opposite direction: Soviet troops occupy a large part of Europe, and in some places the armies of the Warsaw Pact are placed just a few dozens of kilometers away from Western countries.

It is not the fear of the people that explains the policies of the Kremlin. These are the leaders who tirelessly pursue a campaign aiming to instill a fear in the people, to create in them a paranoid obsession. The foreign threat theory also has another indirect effect on the Russian people, among whom the rulers strive to maintain total obedience to the regime. It is a pretext to justify the shortages of all kinds from which the population suffers: sacrifices are demanded of the people in the name of national duty. But Soviet aggressions cannot be explained by this paranoia of an external threat. There was Cuba where we do not see what threatened the Soviet population. There are, closer to us, Afghanistan, other countries like Angola, etc. No Soviet action is defensive. All of them have an aggressive character. This is visible in the type of armament which the USSR continues to build: atomic submarines or the whole new high seas fleet which has no defensive character and which the USSR does not need to defend its maritime borders which are limited.

E.S.: The aggression in Afghanistan or the African schemes of the USSR are only internal political operations?

V.B.: The links between a repressive domestic policy and the policy of foreign expansion are obvious. Everywhere, a defeat on the external plane has repercussions on the internal politics. This link is even closer in an empire like the USSR where there are 130 different nationalities, some of which have been enslaved by force. A state of external tension, whether real or artificially maintained, allows the regime to maintain its hold over the population.

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FEAR OF THE CONTAGION OF LIBERALIZATION

One cannot imagine all the deprivations that the people undergo in many fields and the fiction of a danger, of a threat, serves as a motive for refusing any concession. This parallelism is visible in the facts. For example, in 1979, at the same time as directives were given to organize the rally called the “Parliament of Peace” and the peace campaign, that same year became the year of the most severe repression against the human rights movements in the USSR. This is the year when we saw the greatest number of arrests among intellectuals.

The thesis of the fear that the USSR feels in the face of the threat of imperialism is utter nonsense. But there is a fear: first of all the fear of the leaders, insofar as they may be afraid, faced with the situation inside the Soviet Union, of this tension which may one day erupt. At the same time, they are afraid of the contagion of any liberalization which would immediately spread to other countries of the bloc. It is also the very aspect of the democratic system of the countries of the West, which show themselves capable of both ensuring their peoples' material abundance and all freedoms. The fears of the Soviet leaders are not born of the threat coming from the West, but of the example set by the Western democratic system.

E.S.: Can something be done to ensure that the USSR liberalizes its system, which would reduce internal tension?

V.B.: One should never fool oneself by thinking that a unilateral gesture of relaxation on the part of the West or a concession could have the shadow of an influence on the behavior of the Soviet leaders. However, one can imagine a hypotheses in which we could exert pressure on the USSR and the evolution of its policy in the direction of liberalization. Let us imagine that, as I recommend, there is a considerable reduction in trade credits and in Western trade and supplies. This would force the regime to undertake a fundamental reform of its economy. This reform was considered in the 1960s. Its supporters demonstrated that it would be successful, increase labor productivity, etc. But the party apparatus saw a danger in this kind of reform because loosening control over the economy would amount to lessening the grip of the regime on the life of the nation, the reforms presupposing greater individual initiative. The party apparatus was resolutely against reform and looked for other ways to remedy the poor state of the economy. It resorted to the so-called “detente” policy as an alternative to the reforms: the detente made it possible to obtain commercial credits from the West and everything that the rigid planning system did not allow to produce. Things like high technology or wheat were obtained while leaving the system as it was, thanks to the illusions the West nourishes regarding the benefits of relaxation of tension.

E.S.: What you are saying goes against the widely held theory that increased trade relations will result in higher living standards for the Soviets. As a consequence, it was expected, in the longer term, that freed from the daily oppression of shortages, they would begin to exert pressure on the rulers to obtain more freedom.

V.B.: The advocates of this absurd thesis — like the all too famous Samuel Pisar — do not understand an elementary thing which is fundamental in regard to the Soviet regime: the party cannot, in any case, grant an improvement in the standard of living of the population, precisely because, then, it will become more economically independent. The party ensures that this does not happen. The reduction in the pressure of shortages is seen by managers as a risk. Those who profess these ideas only show, assuming they are sincere, that they have not the slightest idea of the mechanisms of power in the USSR: the increase in economic exchanges that they advocate only helps the regime by allowing it to make the population survive as best it can and to devote itself to the tasks the regime deems the most important: armament and external expansion.

E.S.: However, a few years ago, this theory of relaxation through exchanges was presented as a panacea by many “sovietologists.”

V.B.: I know who. It was a fashion at one time. It is characteristic of the attitude of the West: we do nothing, but we forge theories. It is very pleasant: We meet the top brass and we think that we are contributing to progress. I am convinced, on the contrary, that if in the 1960s and 1970s the West had refused to increase its trade with the USSR and had reduced its supplies to the Soviet economy to a minimum, the Moscow government would have found itself forced to introduce deep reforms in its economy, the economy which was no longer viable without the contributions from the West.

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WE ARE WAITING FOR A CHANGE IN THE POWER TEAM

This possibility is not to be excluded either today, when we expect a change in the team which is in power. Those who will replace the current one may wish to start over on a new basis. But, to promote change, you need to have a clear view of political realities. We can take the American wheat case as an example. Wheat has been supplied regularly, for years, and the theorists you speak of — such as American liberals and industrialists — present two arguments for continuing these deliveries: they say that it makes the Soviet Union dependent. However, dependency only exists if, at any time, you are prepared to stop deliveries. But if you are not, there is no addiction. It should not be forgotten that when the volume of goods exported to the USSR increases, it is on the contrary the Western supplier who becomes dependent on the Soviet Union. The second argument is this: the people will know who provides them with food and when the Soviet man eats his bread, he will know that he eats American bread. He will also know which system is the most developed and the most efficient. This is total nonsense. First, no one will tell the Russians that it is American wheat; wheat supplies are never mentioned in the press or on the radio.

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THE RUSSIAN PEOPLE WILL NOT SEE AMERICAN BREAD

Second, they will not eat “American bread” because it will supplement the stocks in the military depots. It is only when the normal shelf life is exceeded that the stored products which may deteriorate are released for general consumption. Never before that. A large part of this wheat imports will go, moreover, to the communist countries which need it even more, or else to other countries where the interests of Moscow are considered essential and which the USSR supports. In any case, the Soviet people will not see the “American bread.”

E.S.: Some pacifists in Western Europe advocate unilateral disarmament. For example, by renouncing the Pershing in advance. So the Russians would feel less threatened and would also disarm.

V.B.: This theory is again a completely wrong conception. It was born from the idea that tensions in the world are due to mutual incomprehension. It is a discovery of the great brains of the West: if the peoples of the world had reciprocal trust, if they understood each other, they would renounce armed conflicts. We must therefore encourage understanding between them. But the USSR is not hostile and aggressive because it does not understand the West. It's because of its system, its structure. A cobra is dangerous, not because it does not understand, but because that is its nature. You will not be able to change it and that is why if you make this “unilateral gesture,” and especially if the concessions are large enough — and it is to be expected that they will be — it will have no other result than to make the Soviet Union more aggressive still. This way you provoke its aggressiveness and force it to do what it didn't intend to do. You are forcing the USSR to push its advantages further. It is obligated to fill every void you leave. This system works like a spring: if it finds a free space, it penetrates there in order to remain always taut. Otherwise, the regime cannot maintain the level of tension which is its condition of existence. Of course, this idea of a one-sided concession is suicide for the West. People do not understand this very simple situation. The question is asked in an emotional way. We say: “If we disarm, will we see the Soviets rush into Europe with their tanks? Will we see them in Paris, in London? This is unthinkable.” Maybe not and, indeed, why would they do it? Soviet troops do not absolutely have to come here, to Cambridge. In reality, the government does not even want it. What would the Soviets obtain in a Europe disorganized by occupation, which supplies them with high technology and trade credit? They don't want that. But the system has its own logic and they will invade Europe despite their lack of desire, as they advanced in Afghanistan where they found nothing, only mountainous rocks and a hostile and obstinate people. The logic of the system forced them to intervene and the known process was set in motion. 

This process is the same everywhere: self-censorship is installed under the blackmail of fear and the threat of pro-Soviet political parties which have the powerful support of the USSR. The fear of the population will make the neighboring power an increasingly important factor in domestic policy. The people will accept their dictates one after another and this will continuously strengthen the Soviet system. It is clear that as long as there is a democratic system in Germany or France, it will be difficult for the Soviets to dictate their demands, but if we imagine that under threat and blackmail the Communists come to power, it is obvious that the Soviet Union will immediately start viewing these territories as its dependencies and will decide what kind of communism is to be established there, what social order is to be established there. It is in Moscow that decisions will be made regarding who should be secretary general of the Communist Party. This will create growing dependence because as long as a communist regime does not yet exist in a Western country, this country does not pose a problem for the USSR. But the day communism is installed there, the Soviets can never allow it to fall. It would be a fatal risk for them. As long as a communist regime did not exist in Afghanistan, Soviet tanks did not enter it. When communist regime was established there, its survival became a vital necessity for the Soviets.

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COLONIALIST POLICY WITHIN THE USSR

E.S.: You have often said that we must help the Russian people because they are the West's best ally in the struggle for freedom. The question that immediately arises is how, in concrete terms, the West could help the Russian people who are under the yoke of such a powerful and oppressive regime?

V.B.: Let's consider this by looking at the situation in various fields, starting with international relations and diplomacy. It is a fact that, until today, no pressure has ever been exerted on the USSR with regard to the problem of its own minority nationalities. The question of decolonization exists, it is debated. There are UN resolutions on decolonization and the right to self-determination of peoples. This question has never been asked and discussed by governments, diplomacy and public opinion in the West about the peoples living in the territory of the USSR. Thus, when for the first time, following the aggression in Afghanistan, third world countries such as Muslim countries voted against the USSR, it was necessary to immediately ask the question of the peoples subjected to a colonialist regime inside the USSR. Why not now look at the problem of discrimination against living Muslim minorities and the Soviet Union? The question is closely linked to that of Afghanistan, which can be taken as a starting point for examining the situation of the Volga Tatars, Georgians and other minority peoples of the USSR.

Another important problem is that of the ideological struggle. The Soviet Union has pursued this struggle quite freely, unilaterally, for many decades. The West not only does not try to retaliate by imposing its own ideological views, but does not even think of defending itself. The best illustration of this situation is precisely the pacifist movement. It is necessary to oppose it with a similar struggle, which nobody does.

There is also the problem of information, particularly through radio broadcasts. The objection that they are scrambled is only an alibi. We know that the power of transmitters can be boosted to such a degree that no interference will make them inaudible. This is proven by studies of technicians. There is a technique that can even allow us to penetrate the territories of the USSR and the countries of the East by television broadcast from a satellite. It is only a question of means. And of course of will.

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THE ABSENCE OF SANCTIONS STRENGTHENS THE REGIME

Another aspect concerns the war waged by the Soviet regime in Afghanistan. You have to understand that the soldiers who are sent there are not volunteers. They are not fighting to defend their homeland either. These are people who are caught in a vice, who cannot free themselves from this situation because deserting the army is a crime punishable by death. Running away is not possible: they cannot cross Pakistan. They are therefore unquestionably men who, against their will, are forced to defend a regime that is completely foreign to them. It is an inextricable situation, but we must work to find a solution for these soldiers. In the case of Afghanistan, it would be about creating the conditions that would allow them to regain their freedom if they escaped.

E.S.: You are aware that such suggestions immediately provoke the howls of the leaders of the Kremlin, who regard the slightest criticism of their policies as interference in Soviet internal affairs? If we talk about the peoples colonized inside the Soviet empire, you imagine that they will stir up the universe.

V.B.: Precisely, we must let them howl. These are issues that are too important for us to be silent. We must raise them in an uncompromising way: the Soviet Union is dangerous, and first of all because it oppresses its own people. By asking this question, we are not getting involved in some vague inner matter, we are trying to create a less explosive world. And this is an area governed by international treaties signed by the USSR.

E.S.: This question arose in a concrete way about Poland. Here too, it was said that we had to help the Polish people, and not the regime. But in fact, we could not take effective measures to support Polish workers.

V.B.: Above all, we must ask the question of economic sanctions again. Unfortunately, the West adopted the worst attitude deciding that it could not apply economic sanctions, among other things because it would be detrimental to its interests. Of course, it has been said that economic sanctions will ultimately be directed against the Polish people themselves. But the absence of sanctions strengthens the regime of generals and, as for the people, it is only the establishment of a healthy and stable economy that could improve their situation. The absence of sanctions allows the regime to continue in the same way without making an effort to clean up the economy. It is the same situation as the one we talked about in regard to Russia.

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POLAND HAS TO BECOME BANKRUPT

It is even more urgent that the West declares Poland bankrupt. Some say that the USSR suffers higher damages as long as this bankruptcy is not being declared because in order to serve its own interests it must help Poland. I am not convinced that this is true. First, because if bankruptcy was really more advantageous for the USSR, it would already had been declared. But, again, I am not competent to talk about economics. What I can talk about is politics and psychology. Which, in the present case, is the same thing, because the policy towards the USSR is a question of psychology. Psychologically, it is a terrible blow to the Polish people that the West is giving aid to the Jaruzelski regime. If this regime were declared bankrupt — whatever the cost — it would have had an enormous psychological effect on the Polish people, as on the Soviet people. Can one imagine the significance of the fact that a socialist state is declared bankrupt thirty-five years after the proclamation of socialism, and of the socialist experience? Even better: the Polish bankruptcy would have brought it upon the other countries of the Soviet bloc, and would have put the USSR in a state close to bankruptcy. Because all these countries are interdependent, they are linked by Comecon (the Organization for Economic Mutual Assistance of Communist Countries), and this would have led to a freeze of economic exchanges with the West, which would —even if temporarily — constitute a huge shock for the Soviet bloc. It is in this sense that — in my opinion — the Polish bankruptcy should have been declared.

E.S.: You have often attacked the business circles of the West which are opposed to economic sanctions against Poland because they are above all concerned with continuing to collect interest on the sums lent.

V.B.: The fatal error was this policy of economic cooperation, and the absurd theory that the indebtedness of the communist countries would make them dependent on their Western creditors. For years we have extended this, and now it is the West that has become dependent on these countries, and lost all freedom of action. Despite everything, the West is obliged to support these oppressive regimes.

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LEONID BREZHNEV IS PRACTICALLY NON-EXISTENT

I know that bankruptcy would result in huge losses, but I believe that these so-called businessmen need to be punished, and that the West has made an unforgivable mistake by committing billions to the East, while imagining — because of his complete lack of knowledge of the communist regime — that it was saving humanity from war. In this area, stupidity is a crime and should be punished as such.

E.S.: There is no doubt that despite his TV appearances and official trips, Leonid Brezhnev is practically non-existent. The day is nearing when he will leave the political scene because he will be dead, or that we will be forced to admit that he is incapable of governing. In any case, we can consider that the question of succession of power is already open. How can one imagine the development of the situation in the immediate future after Brezhnevism?

V.B.: Today this question can only be answered in general terms. As you have noticed, his management colleagues do not wish him dead. They try to keep him alive by all means, even through black magic! This is because they consider the present moment to be very unfavorable for the opening of the power struggle. I can't say if there are two or three groups in contention, but what is interesting is that none of these groups considers that now is the time to engage in this competition. And that's understandable. There is currently great tension in the world, conflict situations are numerous and, in such an atmosphere, the struggle for power, which would inevitably begin after the death or departure of Brezhnev, will have to sap the full attention of the Soviet leaders and mobilize all their efforts. A serious flaw in the Soviet system is that, because of its excessive centralization, it cannot function when it does not have a leadership which is entirely devoted to the tasks of government.

In the Western system, if a president dies or leaves, everything continues to run smoothly. This is not at all the case in the USSR where, inevitably, a struggle for power begins between the leaders.

What can they try to do in this case? As a first step, they will try to put in place a temporary system that will allow them to function, a sort of collective leadership like the troikas of the past, in order to get through this difficult period. They feel that in the current tense atmosphere the power struggle would lead to a disaster.

In my opinion, events like Souslov's death have led to a situation where the main forces of power in the Kremlin are now men like Andropov or Ustinov, and not the old party “apparatchiks” of the older generations. I do not know if — from the point of view of the West — it is for the better or for worse. This is another question. What we can say is that Andropov is a smarter man than the old caciques, more cunning.

Any new Soviet power, whatever it may be, will take care to present a better image of the Soviet Union to the world. This is why they will, in the very first months, make an effort to correct the negative aspects of their policy of recent times, by arranging to attribute them to the previous head of power, to his senility or to his debility.

We must not be fooled — this will not mean a sudden turn in the course of current politics. These will only be maneuvers to create a favorable impression, and hope for change.

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THE PROBLEMS ARE ALWAYS THE SAME SINCE 1917

It is possible that under these conditions the West could exert very strong pressure on staffing points and in concrete cases. For example, for the release of certain people. And it is conceivable that the Soviet leaders would thus make small, very limited concessions.

E.S.: Of course, you do not believe in the idea that there is in the leadership of the party this division between doves and hawks, which we talk about in the West?

V.B.: This is obviously absurd. The difference between the projects of the different Soviet clans is only in the way in which you will be eaten. Because, one way or another, that remains the goal, whichever team is in power, and whatever is its composition.

E.S.: And what changes in the interior can we expect from Brezhnev's successor?

V.B.: The development of the internal situation is obviously the area where change constitutes the most glaring and pressing need of Russian society. It is a huge problem and no one knows how it can be solved. In the first place, it is the problem of agriculture. Already now, we have reached a situation where about half of the food products are supplied by the tiny private sector, these plots the size of pocket handkerchiefs from which the peasants derive a proportionately enormous production. For the regime, it is intolerable. Not only because, theoretically, it is in contradiction with the dogma of collectivist agriculture, but much more because it means that the village dictates the prices to the city. This situation seems unacceptable to them, but they have tolerated it throughout their history, and that is why there was forced collectivization and why comrade Bukharin was sacrificed, along with so many others.

They cannot accept change in this area, because it would mean for them to lose control over the economy. So, as always, they only have two ways out.

Soviet problems have remained the same since 1917: they never change. The leaders go round in circles, the same circle.

The alternative is either the NEP (Lenin's new economic policy of partially re-establishing private enterprise) or collectivization. Today, this means that promoting the operation of these private plots represents a step back from the dogma of collectivist agriculture. But to resort to a reinforced collectivization, that would provoke a very strong resistance and great dissatisfaction. Will the new team be able to do it? I do not know. I doubt it, but that doesn't mean they won't try! This is the unknown.

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REFORM SUPPORTERS HAVE SUFFERED A DEFEAT

E.S.: Does this suggest that there may be a worsening of the situation in agriculture and especially the food supply?

V.B.: But that doesn't worry them. They accept the idea of hunger, provided it is Soviet hunger, in accordance with socialist laws. I am not saying that they will start reinforcing collectivization, but they can do it, although it could be a very serious blow for them, because we are no longer in the 1920s or the 1930s. Since then new generations have arrived, which have different living conditions, a different attitude. 

The serious internal problem, which cannot be left unresolved, is that of the economy and they will have to deal with it immediately. Culture, society or “Soviet man” are all secondary, they are the superstructure. The economy is the fundamental problem.

E.S.: Don't you think that among the leaders there will be men who will think that one must all the same accept the idea that a certain reformism is necessary?

V.B.: There have been such people, even in the past, in the late Sixties and early Seventies. Strange as it may sound, one of these men was Kosygin, a former Chairman of the Council of Ministers, who felt that reforms were necessary. He was the last to hold this view. Will Andropov or someone else take that line? It's hard to say. At the time, he was in a position close to that of Kosygin. He felt closer to Kosygin and supported him up to a point, but will he continue in that direction? It will also depend on his opponents, on what they propose, because it is always necessary in the USSR to consider the opinion of the opposing groups.

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E.S.: For the first time, today there are observers of the international situation, who believe that the risk of war exists in any case, who speak of it as a possibility. Faced with this crisis situation, do you think there are leaders in the Soviet Union who will try to do something for genuine relaxation of international relations and not just relaxation which is only a tactic, a smoke screen to hide the basic aggressiveness of the USSR you were talking about?

V.B.: You see, real relaxation is dangerous for the leadership of the Kremlin. This would mean a slow step back for them. Perhaps that would be the most reasonable choice, but in my opinion, they will only do so in the event of extreme necessity, of imminent danger of retaliation from the West. I believe, on the other hand, that this atmosphere of fear of war which has gripped the West is not at all justified. There is no indication that the threat of war — and I mean an all-out war, nuclear war — is more real today than it was two years ago. The West — we agree, don't we? — will never take the initiative of such a war. As for the Soviets, they simply do not need it, it is against their interests. They will earn much more if they make the West give in by a simple threat. It is more advantageous for them. It is outright victory. We forget that Soviet-type aggression is not the aggression of the past, of the nineteenth century. It is a double assault; first, ideological aggression. When Stalin tried to attack Finland directly, it was still at a time when the Soviets did not know what would work for them and what would not. And he burned his fingers. It is so much easier instead of attacking head-on, to start by destabilizing a state from within, to catch it in a web of ideological and commercial relations, etc., to wait until in the end of it falls in your hand, like a ripe fruit… Why the war? It doesn't make sense to them. Take, for example, a country like Norway, it is a small country.

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USSR TACKLES DEFENSELESS VICTIMS

The USSR could occupy it at any moment, but first of all, they will find themselves facing desperate resistance from the Norwegians, resistance which will last a long time and cause them considerable losses, while the rest of Europe will be on high alert. The Soviets made this mistake in Afghanistan where the country was already prepared from within. There was a Communist government there. And yet the Soviets found themselves faced with hostility from 90% of the population, who opposed them with desperate resistance. The USSR will undoubtedly learn the lesson from this failure. They will conclude that the war would be even more difficult with the developed nations of the West. In the Third World of the Far East or Africa, it is something else. It is helpless against them. It does not have the American nuclear umbrella, it is not able to defend itself on its own, it is open to Soviet aggression. It's a big piece of cake that can be swallowed! Why go to the Norwegian mountains, reduce a country to ashes, when there are territories like this big one? Thailand, with its wealth, or Iran, with the opening towards the Persian Gulf, Angola with its natural resources, Namibia which are all within their reach. These countries so much more accessible to them than Europe and the NATO countries. The USSR is a beast which does not like to attack when it knows it will encounter a counterattack. He attacks defenseless victims ...

E.S.: A final word on the situation which has arisen in the Federal Republic of Germany as a result of the campaign of pacifist movements?

V.B.: First, the Germans were broken by WWI. And there was, after World War II, denazification. This had consequences even more important than the war itself. It instilled in the Germans a feeling of guilt. They no longer want to be aggressive under any circumstances. Which is understandable.

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PACIFISTS BRING WAR

But, as soon as the threat of real danger emerges and is felt by 55 million of Germans, you will see all this left-wing youth vanish, this light scum that rushes into the streets for mass demonstrations. All this will be replaced by a groundswell coming from the right, as a reaction, and bring to power the Christian Democrats. But that won't mean war. It is the pacifists who bring the war. Resolute people, on the contrary, remove the risk. When will Europe understand this?